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This article discusses the grand strategy imperatives of 37 foreign policy
experts in Washington, DC. in response to President Donald Trump's
nationalist challenge to the post-WWII international order concept. Using
an abductive reconstructivist methodology to analyze in-depth
interviews, five grand strategy imperatives or rules for action shared by
all actors were identified: safeguarding US global leadership, maintaining
alliances, securing US prosperity, value orientation, and the belief in a
mission. Based on the interpretation of these rules for action, four types
of foreign policy experts were distinguished: nationalists, realists,
Abstract: pragmatic liberals, and liberals. The latter three expert types, also
labelled globalists, were united in their opposition to the nationalists'
demolition of the international order but divided along partisan and
ideological lines about the meaning and implementation of the rules for
action. Realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals were also unsure of how
to explain and respond to Trump's nationalism beyond a defensive or
wishful hope to save the vestiges of an US-centric international order.
The findings demonstrate the value of in-depth qualitative interviews for
explaining elite beliefs, illustrating the rich insights for policy analysis
that can be gained through this methodology.
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1. Introduction
The election of President Donald Trump in 2016 signaled a shift in the US toward an
outspoken nationalistic foreign policy, setting the country on a path of potential
disagreements with many of its traditional allies and away from the rules-based international

Fo

order paradigm of previous decades.1 This change recently led some senior academic

rP

opinion-shapers and non-mainstream think tank experts to question the foundations of the
postwar order grand strategy,2 specifically the long-term sustainability of maintaining US

rR

ee

1

There is no space here to review the literature about the international order concept in

ev

detail. For a short summary of the evolution of this order, see Rebecca Friedman Lissner and

iew

Mira Rapp-Hooper, 'The Day after Trump: American Strategy for a New International
Order,' The Washington Quarterly, 4:1 (2018), p. 7-25. Other summaries and critiques have
been published by Andrew Moravcsik, 'Taking Preferences seriously: A Liberal Theory of
International Politics,' International Organization, 51:4 (1997), p. 513-53; Daniel Deudney
and G. John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order,' Review of
International

Studies,

25:2

(1999),

p.179–96;

Knud

Erik

Jørgensen,

'Liberal

Internationalism,' in Knud Erik Jørgensen et al. eds., SAGE Handbook of European Foreign
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global primacy through instruments like the current alliance system, trade agreements,
military interventions, and export of US values. These critics3 argue that it is increasingly
impractical and unrealistic to continue the US foreign policy of the post-WWII and postCold War period given the global trends toward a multi-centric realignment of powers, the

Fo

Policy (London: Sage, 2013), pp. 501-15; G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The

rP

Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton, NJ: Princeton

ee

University Press, 2011); Graham Allison, 'The Myth of the Liberal Order: From Historical
Accident to Conventional Wisdom,' Foreign Affairs, 97:4 (2018), pp. 124-33; Christopher

rR

Layne, 'The US Foreign Policy establishment and Grand Strategy: How American Elites

2

ev

obstruct Strategic Adjustment,' International Politics, 54:3 (2017), pp. 260–75.

iew

In this study the use of the term "grand strategy" is focused on foreign policy only and

excludes, for analytical reasons, the domestic arena. Here grand strategy is defined as the
'means and ends to produce national security…. [and] a sense of national identity…about
the nation’s role and position in world politics.' Georg Löfflmann, 'From the Obama Doctrine
to America First: The Erosion of the Washington Consensus on Grand Strategy,'
International Politics, 20:1 (2019), pp. 2-3. According to Posen, grand strategy is based on
a 'a quiet consensus among the foreign and security policy elite,' see Barry Posen, 'Command
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legacies of self-inflicted US foreign policy mistakes in recent history, the long-term erosion
of the country's economic and technological clout, and the creeping loss of public trust in
the US elites' leadership capability, their policies, and values.
This critique of the fundamentals of the liberal world order, however, has not been heeded

Fo

by many members of the foreign policy community, including not only foreign policy think
tank policy analysts but also media commentators, diplomats, members of the State

rP

Department, Congressional staffers, and other experts in federal agencies, lobby

rR

ee

organizations, and academia. After Trump's inauguration, most of these foreign policy elite

of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony,' International Security, 28:1

3

ev

(2003), pp. 19–20.

iew

See, for example, John Mearsheimer, 'Bound to Fail: The Rise and Fall of the Liberal

International Order,' International Security, 43:4. (2019), pp. 7–50; Charles L. Glaser, 'A
Flawed Framework: Why the Liberal International Order Concept Is Misguided,' 43:4
(2019), pp. 51–87; John Mearsheimer, The Great Delusion: Liberal Dreams and
International Realities (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2018); Ivo H. Daalder and
James M. Lindsay, The Empty Throne: America's Abdication of Global Leadership (New
York: Public Affairs, 2018); G. John Ikenberry, 'The End of Liberal International Order?'
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were not in the mood to discuss or develop a new substance and direction for US foreign
policy in recognition of ongoing global changes.4 Seeing the foundations of the existing
rules-based order under assault by President Donald Trump, they fell back into a defensive
modus operandi because they did not want to be "present at the destruction" of an order that
- in their views - had worked so well in the past.5 This raises the question why, now and

Fo

then, many members of the foreign policy community are reticent to critically evaluate US

ev

rR

ee

demand new answers.6

rP

grand strategy during a time when the enormous shifts in domestic and international relations

iew

International Affairs, 94:1 (2018), pp. 7-23; Joseph S. Nye, 'The Rise and Fall of American
Hegemony from Wilson to Trump,' International Affairs, 95:1 (2019), pp. 63-80. Ted Galen
Carpenter, Gullible Superpower (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2019); Stephen M. Walt,
The Hell of Good Intentions: America's Foreign Policy Elite and the Decline of US Primacy
(New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2018); Richard Haass, A World in Disarray:
American Foreign Policy and the Crisis of the Old Order (New York: Penguin Press, 2017);
Andrew J. Bacevich, The New American Militarism: How Americans Are Seduced by War,
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The fact that the US foreign policy community was caught unprepared by Trump's
nationalist "revolution," their perceived bystander mentality, and their intellectual
procrastination toward adapting new, forward-looking concepts and ideas, has often
provoked the "blob" label for them. The term was originally derogatorily coined by President
Obama's Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communication Ben Rhodes in a

Fo

2016 New York Times interview with the David Samuels.7 Since then the phrase has become

rP

popularized as a label for the attitude of a large segment of the foreign policy elite that lives

ee

in a groupthink tower, regurgitating conventional wisdom about precepts of the prevailing
international order.8

ev

rR
iew

2nd edition. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013); Kori Schake, America vs the West:
Can the Liberal World Order Be Preserved? (Melbourne, Australia: Penguin Random
House, 2018); Deudney and Ikenberry, 'Liberal World: The Resilient Order,' Foreign
Affairs, 97:4 (2018), pp. 16–24; and Paul Staniland, 'Misreading the "Liberal Order": Why
We

Need

New

Thinking

in

American

Foreign

Policy,'

29

July

https://www.lawfareblog.com/misreading-liberal-order-why-we-need-new-thinkingamerican-foreign-policy, accessed 9 March 2020.

Cambridge University Press

2018,
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The "blob" thesis has gained traction in political discourse because it expresses the public's
lack of trust in the foreign policy community's predictions and policy recommendations.9
This uneasiness has been articulated by some prominent and outspoken academic critics.
They allege an uncritical grand strategy consensus among mainstream foreign policy
commentators, experts, advisers, and lobbyists in the Beltway. Stephen Walt is one of those

Fo

critics: he defines the blob as 'individuals and organizations that actively engage on a regular

rP

basis with issues of international affairs'10 in and outside of US government. Since they are

4

rR

ee

involved in policy advising and policy making, they are part of a dense network that crosses

On the reactions of the US foreign policy community, see Patrick Porter, 'Why US Grand

ev

Strategy has not Changed: Power, Habit and the Foreign Policy Establishment,' International

iew

Security, 42:4 (2018), pp. 9–46; Patrick Porter, 'A World Imagined: Nostalgia and Liberal
Order,' Policy Analysis, 843 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, June 2018); Dina Smeltz, Karl
Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, Joshua Busby et. al., The Foreign Policy Establishment or Donald
Trump: Which Better Reflects American Opinion?, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, April
2018, pp. 1-21; Dina Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, Craig Kafura, and Lily Wojtowicz,
America Engaged, American Public Opinion and US Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on
Global Affairs, 2018, pp. 2-35; Stephen Chaudoin, Helen V. Milner, and Dustin Tingley,
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partisan lines either through formal shared membership in organizations or informal personal
relationships and associations, including friendships, marriage, and kinship.11 In government
positions like the State Department, DoD, and Congressional staffers, or as members of think
tanks, academia, lobby organizations, and the media, these "influentials"12 wield direct and
indirect power by shaping foreign policy and policing the boundaries of acceptable policy

rP

Fo

views.

According to Porter, another critic of the US foreign policy community, one of the main

ee

traits of the blob is the habit of self-censorship based on 'obvious, axiomatic choices made

rR

from unexamined assumptions,'13 including the belief in the liberal internationalist ideology

ev

'Down but Not Out: A Liberal International American Foreign Policy,' in Robert Jervis,

iew

Robert, Francis J. Gavin, Joshua Rovner, Diane N. Labrosse (eds), Chaos in the Liberal
Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics in the Twenty-First Century (New
York: Columbia University Press, 2018), pp. 61-98. Benjamin H. Friedman and Harvey M.
Sapolsky, 'Unrestrained: The Politics of America's primacist Foreign Policy,' in A. Trevor
Thrall and Benjamin H. Friedman (eds), US Grand Strategy in the 21st Century (London:
Routledge, 2018), pp. 220-42 explain some of the reasons for the strong support for the
maintenance of the postwar order. For a summary see also Congressional Research Service,
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of primacy, American exceptionalism, and military interventionism according to which 'the
United States’ hegemonic leadership is axiomatically good for the United States and the
world.'14
The blob thesis of a foreign policy elite intent on upholding the traditional order at all cost

Fo

is contradicted by the "polarization" thesis. Based on earlier leadership studies15 about the
breakdown of the US foreign policy consensus, these adherents16 argue that in recent

rP

decades the divisions about the strategic and tactical outlines of US foreign policy decision-

ee

making have become more pronounced along ideological and Democratic-Republican

rR

partisan lines, a thesis that fits pluralist theory assumptions.17

ev

US Role in the World: Background and Issues for Congress. 14 February 2019.

iew

https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R44891.
5

Mearsheimer, 'Bound to Fail,' p. 7.

6

'Present at the destruction' is a play on US Secretary of State Dean Acheson's 1969 memoir

Present at the Creation (New York, W.W. Norton, 1969) describing his role as chief
architect of the post-WWII world order.
7

See David Samuels, 'The aspiring Novelist who became Obama’s Foreign-Policy Guru,'

New Yorker, 5 May 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/08/magazine/the-aspiring-
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Shapiro and Bloch-Elkon, for example, refer to various large quantitative surveys about
foreign policy attitudes conducted by the PEW research center, the Chicago Council on
Global Affairs, the Council on Foreign Relations, and others, claiming that partisan conflict
and polarization between the American public and its leaders reaches back to the 1980s but
became increasingly apparent during the G.W. Bush and Obama administrations.18 They

iew

ev

rR

ee

rP

Fo
novelist-who-became-obamas-foreign policy-guru.html, accessed 9 March 2020. Jeffrey
Goldberg,

'The

Obama

Doctrine,'

The

Atlantic,

April

2016,

pp.

70-90,

https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine, accessed 9 March 2020. See also Ben Rhodes, The
World as it is. A Memoir of the Obama White House (New York: Random House, 2018).
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argue that almost unbridgeable partisan fissures developed between Republican and
Democrats, ideological conservatives and liberals. According to defenders of the
polarization thesis, Republicans became dominated by realists and neo-conservatives who
favored a robust foreign policy of hard power to promote US interests, such as economic
sanctions, military pressure, and coalitions of the willing. Democrats, on the other hand,

Fo

were dominated by liberal internationalists and preferred instead, but not exclusively, soft

rP

Some of the critics like Walt and Porter have extensively used this term to criticize the US

ee

8

foreign policy establishment. See Walt, 'The Hell of Good Intentions,' pp. 112-13 and Porter,

rR

'Why US Grand Strategy has not Changed,' pp. 9 - 46.

See Colin Dueck, 'GOP Foreign Policy Opinion in the Trump Era', Foreign Policy

iew

Research Institute (April 23, 2018),

ev

9

https://www.realcleardefense.com/articles/2018/04/23/gop_foreign_policy_opinion_in_the
_trump_era_113355.html, accessed 9 March 2020.
10

See Walt, The Hell of Good Intentions, pp. 95, 103. For Walt, blob members typically are

represented by (transnational) progressives, libertarians affiliated with the Cato Institute, and
academic realists. But he treats them less polemical compared to Walter Russell Mead who
uses the term "Davoisie" ('In It to Win,' American Interest, 27 January 2015), or John Bolton,
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power tools, pushing, for example, a values agenda, like democracy and human rights
promotion or supporting the responsibility to protect doctrine.
From the viewpoint of 'polarization' advocates, more recent surveys show that splits have
emerged within both major parties and among the foreign policy elite on questions about

Fo

how to deal with terrorism, failed states, immigration and refugees, globalization,
international treaties and free trade agreements, alliance burden sharing, and foreign aid.19

iew

ev

rR

ee

rP
who called foreign policy elites as "High Minded" in: Surrender is not an Option: Defending
America at the United Nations (New York: Threshold, 2007), pp. 441–55. The Alt-right uses
comparable labels like "commentariat," "expertocracy," "establishment," "elites," and
"globalists," though for derogatory purposes.
11

Similar C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).

Cambridge University Press
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Donald Trump was able to tap into anti-globalist resentments and mobilized support from

12

Robert D. Putnam, The Comparative Study of Political Elites (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:

Prentice Hall, 1976), p.11.
Porter, 'Why US Grand Strategy has not Changed,' p. 11.

14

Patrick Porter, 'How the US Foreign Policy Establishment Constrains American Grand

rP

Fo

13

Strategy', Policy Brief, International Security (June 8, 2018), pp. 4, 13-14. See also Center

ee

for International Security and Governance, International Security Forum, Full Report
(Bonn: University of Bonn, 2018), pp. 46-47; and Löfflmann (2019), pp. 7, 13.

rR

15

Eugene R. Wittkopf, Faces of Internationalism: Public Opinion and Foreign Policy

ev

(Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1990); Ole R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, 'The

iew

Post-Cold War Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Leaders: Persistence or Abatement of
Partisan Cleavages?' in Eugene R. Wittkopf (ed), The Future of American Foreign Policy,
2nd edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1994), pp. 127-147; Ole R. Holsti, Public
Opinion and American Foreign Policy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2004);
James A. Stimson, Tides of Consent (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Ole
R. Holsti and James N. Rosenau, 'The Structure of Foreign Policy Attitudes among
American Leaders,' Journal of Politics 52 (1990), pp. 94-125.
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fringes of the foreign policy community excluded from the mainstream consensus.

16

See Robert Y. Shapiro and Yaeli Bloch-Elkon, 'Ideological Partisanship and American

Public Opinion toward Foreign Policy,' in Morton H. Halperin, Jeffrey Laurenti, Peter

Fo

Rundlet, and Spencer P. Boyer (eds), Power and Superpower: Global Leadership and
Exceptionalism in the 21st Century (New York: Century Foundation Press, 2007), pp. 49-

rP

68; Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal, Polarized America: The Dance

ee

of Ideology and Unequal Riches (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2006); Barbara Sinclair,
Polarization and the Politics of National Policy Making (Norman, OK: University of

rR

Oklahoma Press, 2006); Charles A. Kupchan and Peter L. Trubowitz, 'Dead Center: The

ev

Demise of Liberal Internationalism in the United States,' International Security, 32:2 (2007),

iew

pp.7-44; Joseph Bafumi and Joseph M. Parent, 'International polarity and America's
polarization,' International Politics, 49:1 (2012), pp. 1–35; Kenneth A. Schultz, 'Perils of
Polarization for US Foreign Policy,' The Washington Quarterly, 40:4 (2017), pp. 7-28; James
M. McCormick and Eugene R. Wittkopf, 'Bipartisanship, Partisanship, and Ideology in
Congressional-Executive Foreign Policy Relations, 1947-1988,' The Journal of Politics,
52:4 (1990), pp. 1077-1100. Most recent polls confirm a continuation of the polarization
trend, see Pew Research Center, Public’s 2019 Priorities: Economy, Health Care, Education
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Because both the blob and polarization theses claim to be based on solid evidence, it remains
a puzzle how to reconcile their propositions. Can a foreign policy community that is
polarized along partisan and ideological lines at the same time share an international order

Security

All

Near

Top

Fo

and

of

List,

January,

2019,

https://www.people-

press.org/2019/01/24/publics-2019-priorities-economy-health-care-education-and-security-

rP

all-near-top-of-list/, accessed 9 March 2020.
See the summary of elite and pluralist theory by Thomas R. Dye and Harmon Zeigler, The

ee

17

Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics 14e (Boston, MA:

rR

Cengage, 2009), pp. 10-2, 15-7, and 69.

Robert Y. Shapiro and Yaeli Bloch‐Elkon, 'Do the Facts speak for themselves? Partisan

ev

18

pp. 115-39.
19

iew

Disagreement as a Challenge to Democratic Competence,' Critical Review, 20:1-2 (2008),

Robert Shapiro, 'Liberal Internationalism, Public Opinion, and Partisan Conflict in the

United States,' in Robert Jervis, Francis J. Gavin, Joshua Rovner, and Diane N. Labrosse
(eds), 2018. Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and International Politics
in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia University Press, 2018), pp. 106, 11819.
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consensus? I argue that the answer to this question requires probing beyond quantitative
studies and standardized questionnaires. Using an abductive reconstructivist methodology it
will become evident that both the blob and polarization theses capture elements of prevailing
beliefs among experts but lack a comprehensive explanation of the complexity of US grand
strategy imperatives.

Fo

After a short description of the sample, method, and evaluation, this article will describe the

rP

five fundamental foreign policy "rules for action" identified by the qualitative analysis of 37

ee

in-depth interviews: safeguarding US American global leadership; maintenance of alliances;

rR

securing US prosperity; orientation toward US-defined values; and the belief in a US
mission. From observable regularities of the interviewees' positions toward those

ev

imperatives, four types of foreign policy experts were abductively distinguished:

iew

nationalists, realists, pragmatic liberals,20 and liberals. The latter three types, labeled here

20

Pragmatic liberals mix realists and liberal positions. The adjective 'pragmatic' refers to

someone who looks for practical solutions making the best of a specific political situation
rather than following ideological or value-driven goals. The term is not related to
philosophical or methodological pragmatism. Also, the labels "independent" or "centrist"

Cambridge University Press
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under the umbrella category "globalists," are in favor of upholding the postwar international
order as a win-win arrangement. They oppose the efforts of Trump nationalists to tear down
this order in favor of a transactional and unilateral zero-sum relationship of the US with
friends and foes. But realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals are unsure of how to explain
and respond to Trump's nationalism beyond a defensive or wishful hope to save the vestiges

Fo

of an US-centric international order.

rP

The summary will draw theoretical and methodological conclusions from these empirical

ee

findings and reveal, that the blob thesis, while correctly capturing a pro-international order

rR

consensus among globalists, neglects deeper divisions that divide realists, pragmatic liberals,
and liberal's interpretation of how to achieve international order goals. On the other hand,

ev

the polarization thesis, while correctly describing a partisan and ideological divide among

iew

the foreign policy community, ignores the anti-nationalist consensus of the globalists.21

were avoided because they are associated with voting patterns or a partisan Left-Right
continuum.
21

On the anti-Trump consensus, see Joshua W. Busby and Jonathan Monten, 'Has Liberal

Internationalism Been Trumped?' in Robert Jervis, Robert, Francis J. Gavin, Joshua Rovner,
Diane N. Labrosse (eds), Chaos in the Liberal Order: The Trump Presidency and

Cambridge University Press
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As this study demonstrates, richer and more contemporary insights into the divisions and
consensus of foreign policy experts' grand strategy perceptions can be gained by applying
qualitative methods.

Fo

2. Sample

rP

This study is based on the assumption that foreign policy experts share a set of ingrained
beliefs about the role, function, mission, and obligations of their country in international

ee

affairs.22 It hypothesizes that expert opinion precedes public opinion and influences it in

rR

multiple ways, particularly through the media and through policy advising via think tanks.23

iew

ev
International Politics in the Twenty-First Century (New York: Columbia University Press,
2018), pp. 49-60.
22

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, Germany, Pacifism and Peace Enforcement (Manchester:

Manchester University Press, 2006), p. 21.
23

Gabriel A. Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy (New York: Harcourt,

Brace & Co, 1950); Anthony Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Cambridge, MA:

Cambridge University Press
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In brokerage-type party systems with strong special interest groups, think tanks formulate
policies and promote partisan ideological objectives to members of Congress, the executive,
mass media, and the public.24 Think tanks are in constant competition to have their specific
interpretations of the advancement of national interests accepted as dominant and to provide
definitions of what should be considered "us" versus "them," what is considered legal, useful,

Fo

and desirable for a society, and its special mission in international affairs.25

rP

For this reason, this study focused on interviewing members from prominent Washington,

ee

DC think tanks in addition to selected congressional staffers, diplomats, academics, and

rR

media opinion makers with high reputation and expertise. Of the 111 foreign policy experts

new Policy Elite (New York: Free Press, 1991.
24

iew

ev

Polity Press, 1984); James Allen Smith, The Idea Brokers: Think Tanks and the Rise of the

Lawrence R. Jacobs and Benjamin I. Page, 'Who Influences US Foreign Policy?'

American Political Science Review, 99:1 (2005), pp. 107–23.
25

Alexandra Guisinger and Elizabeth Saunders, 'Mapping the Boundaries of Elite Cues:

How Elites Shape Mass Opinion Across International Issues,' International Studies
Quarterly, 61:2 (2017): pp. 425–41; and Stephen G. Walker, Role Theory and Foreign
Policy Analysis (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1987).

Cambridge University Press
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contacted through a mix of convenience and snowball-sampling methods using funds and
networks from the author’s home university in Michigan, 22 individuals declined to
participate for a variety of reasons and 52 did not respond to phone messages or to emailed
interview requests26. Of the 37 experts (33 percent) who agreed to an interview, 25 were met
face-to-face and 12 questioned by phone.27 The average interview lasted 55 minutes.

Fo

Because the overall population of foreign policy experts cannot be clearly determined, the

rP

sample selection was not representative. Nevertheless, respondents' occupational functions,

ee

party affiliation, age, and sex were considered to ensure that the sample captured a diverse
spectrum of foreign policy experts,28 thereby fulfilling the saturation criteria recommended

rR

Originally it was planned to conduct about 75 interviews but a shortage of funds and

ev

26

iew

research time limited the sample. A larger sample probably would have allowed to map
further nuances within each typology - as between libertarian realists, neo-conservatives,
and so forth.
27

From a quantitative perspective, the study's sample size might appear small. However,

compared with other qualitative interview studies it is still slightly above average, see Mario
Luis Small, 'How Many Cases do I Need?' Ethnography, 10:1 (2009), pp. 5-38; and Mark
Mason, 'Sample Size and Saturation in PhD Studies Using Qualitative Interviews,' Forum

Cambridge University Press
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for qualitative sampling.29
Most respondents came from 18 well-known foreign policy DC think tanks, among them six
conservative, six centrist, and six liberal or progressive institutions.30 Five think tanks were

fqs100387.

rP

28

Fo

Qualitative Social Research, 11:3 (2010), http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-

For comparative reasons, the sample included seven non-US or dual citizens (cases 4, 6,

ee

8, 11, 15, 17, and 19) whose perceptions overlapped with that the other experts, adding
confidence about the consistency of the findings.

rR

29

Janice M. Morse, 'Designing funded qualitative research,' in Norman K. Denzin and Yvonna

ev

S. Lincoln (eds), Handbook of Qualitative Research (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 1994), pp. 220-

Analysis 3e (London: Sage, 2013).
30

iew

35; and Matthew B. Miles, A. Michael Huberman, and Johnny Saldaña, Qualitative Data

This compares with a 'recent study by the progressive media watchdog FAIR of the most

cited think tanks [which] found [that] 48% are centrist, 31 percent are conservative, and 21
percent are left-center or progressive,' see Louis Schubert, Thomas R. Dye and Harmon
Zeigler. The Irony of Democracy: An Uncommon Introduction to American Politics, 17th
edition (Boston, MA: Cengage, 2016), p.72.
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foreign-funded. In addition, a private think tank and a law firm involved with think tank
advising were represented in this category. Thirteen of the 26 think tank interviewees were
directors or presidents of their organizations. Because of the prevalent "revolving door" job
rotating mechanism and the tightly-knit and overlapping networks that characterize the DC
foreign policy elites, many US respondents previously held jobs in federal and state

Fo

positions, academia, the legislative branch, military, foundations, NGOs, other think tanks,

rP

private enterprises, law, and investment firms. For this reason, the sample also included five

ee

university academics affiliated with foreign policy research or think tank institutions as well
as a former State Department Secretary, a diplomat, three Senate staffers, one staffer from

rR

the House of Representatives, and a research director from the Library of Congress.

ev

Eighty-four percent of the 37 respondents were White males, which is typical for the current

iew

race and sex distribution of the expert community in DC. The participants' average age was
54 and ranged from 32 to 91 years. Forty-six percent of the interviewed persons held a PhD
or JD, and many respondents had degrees from Ivy League or similar institutions in the
United States or England, indicating the elite educational status of the sample.31 Sixty

31

Joshua W. Busby and Jonathan Monten, 'Without Heirs? Assessing the Decline of

Establishment Internationalism in US Foreign Policy,' Perspectives on Politics, 6:3 (2008),
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percent of the experts were nonpartisan or their party affiliation was unknown. Among the
15 persons with a known party affiliation, nine were Republican Party members and six were
Democrats. From the variation of responses, it can be deduced that the sample reaches across
ideological and political lines from progressive left to liberal, centrist, conservative, and
nationalist positions.

rP

Fo
3. Reconstructivist Methodology and Evaluation

ee

Analyzing these 37 interviews required making assumptions about the conceptualization and

rR

empirical operationalization of grand strategy imperatives that guide policy actors in their

ev

interpretation and enactment of foreign policy.32 In this study a reconstructivist approach33

iew
pp. 451–72 found that between 42% and 46% of top executive branch officials and the heads
of foreign policy committees in Congress during and after the Cold War came from Ivy
League backgrounds.
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was applied combining ontological, epistemological, and methodological premises from
hermeneutics,34 grounded theory,35 and philosophical pragmatism's "belief is a rule for
action."36 This approach shares a similar focus on the "intersubjective construction of
reality"37 by foreign policy actors as the theories of political and strategic culture and related
concepts like cognitive mapping,38 operational mindset/code,39 framing, or image theory. I

Fo

preferred the reconstructivist methodology for this project because its "rules for action"

rP

concept pays attention to the interaction between political structures and human agency in

32

Nina Silove, 'Beyond the Buzzword: The Three Meanings of "Grand Strategy,"’ Security

ev

Studies, 27:1 (2018), pp. 39-41.
33

rR

ee

the form of coagulated shared ideas, norms, and interests.

iew

The reconstructivist IR approach attempts to understand 'the fundamental script of the role

and identity of … foreign policy' in the views of its actors, see Ulrich Roos, 'Beliefs and
Loyalties in World Politics: A Pragmatic Liberal Framework for Analysis,' in Gunther
Hellmann and Knud E. Jørgensen (eds), Theorizing Foreign Policy in a Globalized World
(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 180. See also Ulrich Franke and Ulrich Roos,
'Actor, Structure, Process: Transcending the State Personhood Debate by Means of a
Pragmatic Liberal Ontological Model for International Relations Theory', Review of
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In this study, rules for action are defined as shared sets of beliefs of actors about grand
strategy imperatives in a specific foreign policy "structure of corporate practice"40 that has
been formed over a long time41 and adheres to basic principles of cognitive consistency and
legitimacy.42 Rules for action are the complex result of internalized social and cultural

iew

ev

rR

ee

rP

Fo
International Studies, 36 (2010), pp. 1057-77; Ulrich Franke and Gunter Hellmann,
'American Pragmatism in Foreign Policy Analysis,' in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of
Politics (2017), pp. 1-16, doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.356.
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learning such as collective memories, traditions, and dominant societal norms. In addition,
they are influenced by shared experiences of historical events, lessons learned from political
decisions and their fall-out, and future expectations.
A reconstructive analysis of interview responses, speech acts, or documents allows the

Fo

trained observer to distill prevalent rules for action contained in these utterances. In
qualitative analysis the focus is therefore not on testing positivist assumptions about expert

rP

Ulrich Oevermann, 'Die Methode der Fallrekonstruktion in der Grundlagenforschung

ee

34

sowie der klinischen und pädagogischen Praxis,' in Klaus Kraimer (ed.), Die
Sinnverstehen

rR

Fallrekonstruktion.

in

der

sozialwissenschaftlichen

Forschung

35

ev

(Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp, 2000), pp. 138-56.

iew

Anselm S. Strauss, Qualitative Analysis for Social Scientists (Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press, 1987); Barney G. Glaser, Basics of Grounded Theory Analysis (Mill
Valley, CA: Sociology Press, 1992).
36

Charles Sanders Peirce, 'How to make our ideas clear,' in Nathan Houser and Christian

J.W. Kloesel (eds), The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings 1, 1867–1893
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992/1878), p. 130. This does not imply that beliefs
are identical with action but points out how beliefs are operationalized into imperatives that
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beliefs using theoretical models of rules for action (which are not yet existing for this specific
situation) and then finding evidence that fits with these predictions. Instead, the goal is to
extract evidence in form of patterns through iterative procedures of coding and analysis.
Through this process generic knowledge and new conclusions are drawn (see also above
section 'Sample and Evaluation'). This way the actors' (not the researchers') understanding

Fo

of fundamental rules for action and related typologies are reconstructed. 43 By creating new

rP

theses open to empirical falsification and revision in the future, this study is "crossing

beliefs.45

ev

rR

ee

paradigmatic borderlines,"44 helping us to develop a deeper and richer explanation of elite

iew

can be achieved by specific actions. While imperatives are collectively shared the pathway,
means, and intentions toward achieving them allows for variants of action.
37

Mathias Albert and Stephan Stetter, 'Actorhood in World Politics: The Dialectics of

Agency/Structure within the World Polity,' in Hellmann and Jørgensen, 'Theorizing Foreign
Policy in a Globalized World,' pp. 81-100.
38

Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane (eds), Ideas and Foreign Policy (Ithaca and

London, Cornell UP, 1993), p. 16.
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The evaluation of the audiotaped interviews using MAXQDA qualitative software followed
the flexible coding approach,46 starting out with the creation of summary memos and
indexing the answers to questions about how respondents described their foreign policy
beliefs, lessons learned, challenges ahead, future foreign policy priorities, etc. Then
'summative, salient, essence-capturing, and/or evocative attributes'47 of responses were

Fo

thematically coded into categories like leadership, prosperity, alliances, values, US mission,

39

iew

ev

rR

ee

rP

etc. 48 The latter codes were then further sub-categorized and reordered. The iterative process

Benjamin H. Friedman and Justin Logan, 'Why Washington Doesn’t Debate Grand

Strategy,' Strategic Studies Quarterly, 10:4 (2016), p. 15.
40

Roos, 'Beliefs and Loyalties in World Politics,' p.180.

41

The causes and processes that lead to the long-term formation and change of rules for

action are not a topic of this study. They have been addressed in other contexts, see footnotes
35 and 47.
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of (re)coding, comparing, ordering, linking, and classifying was strengthened by
triangulating the qualitative findings with a quantitative comparative evaluation of
sociodemographic characteristics of the respondents to test the credibility, applicability, and
consistency of the sample, coding, and analytical evaluation.

Fo

Unlike quantitative surveys using pre-set categories and standardized questionnaires
developed by the researcher, the reconstruction of rules for action and the actor typology in

rP

this study was derived from how experts represented their positions in the open-ended

42

rR

ee

interviews. The abductive results are actor-centric, allowing unique and highly reliable

Similar Philipp E. Converse, 'The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics,' in David E.

ev

Apter (ed.), Ideology and Discontent (New York: The Free Press, 1964), pp. 206-61; and

iew

Ole R. Holsti, The "Operation Code" as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems: Final
Report to the National Science Foundation. (Durham, NC: Duke University, 1977).
43

Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett. Case Studies and Theory Development in the

Social Sciences (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p.7.
44

Peter Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, 'Eclectic Theorizing in the Study and Practice of

International Relations,' in Christian Reus-Smit and Duncan Snidal (eds), The Oxford
Handbook of International Relations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 109 -30.
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patterns of thinking emerge from the actors' views, thereby improving our insights into the
complexities of their reasonings. That way elite interviews become 'a tool to tap into political
[actor's] constructs that may otherwise be difficult to examine'49 by standardized survey
questions.

Fo

45

For examples about the application of reconstructive foreign policy analysis, see Ulrich

rP

Roos and Charlotte Rungius, 'Neue Macht, neue Mächte - gute Gründe? Rekonstruktion

ee

einer außenpolitischen Diskursoffensive in Deutschland,' Zeitschrift für Außen- und
Sicherheitspolitik, 9 (2016), pp. 39-78; Ulrich Roos, Deutsche Außenpolitik. Eine

rR

Rekonstruktion der grundlegenden Handlungsregeln (Wiesbaden: Springer VS Verlag für

ev

Sozialwissenschaften, 2010); Ulrich Franke and Ulrich Roos, 'Einleitung: Zu den Begriffen

iew

"Weltpolitik" und "Rekonstruktion",' in Ulrich Franke and Ulrich Roos (eds),
Rekonstruktive Methoden der Weltpolitikforschung (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2013), pp. 729; Hermann Kurthen and Helmar Schöne, 'Aussenpolitische Handlungsregeln in
Deutschland. Ergebnisse aus Experteninterviews während der Libyenkrise 2011,'
Zeitschrift fur Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik, 11:1 (2018), pp. 39-64; Hermann Kurthen
(in press), 'German Foreign Policy Rules for Action during the 2011 Libya Crisis,' German
Politics and Society.
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4. Foreign Policy Rules for Action
This section describes the five foreign policy rules for action and the different interpretation
of their meaning and application by four actor types, both abductively distilled from the

Fo

reconstructive analysis of the 37 interviews. The actor types are labeled as nationalists versus

46

ee

rP

realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals. As mentioned earlier, I also refer to the latter three

Nicole Deterding and Mary C. Waters, 'Flexible Coding of In-depth Interviews: A

rR

Twenty-First-Century Approach,' Sociological Method and Research, (2018), pp.1-32,

47

ev

https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124118799377, accessed 9 March 2020.

iew

Johnny Saldaña, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (London: Sage, 2009),

p. 7.
48

See similar recommendations by Jochen Gläser and Grit Laudel, Experteninterviews und

qualitative Inhaltsanalyse als Instrumente rekonstruierender Untersuchungen (Wiesbaden:
VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2004).
49

Glenn Beamer. 2002. 'Elite Interviews and State Politics Research.' State Politics & Policy

Quarterly, 2:1 (2002), p. 87. See also Iddo Tavory and Stefan Timmermans, 2012. Abductive

Cambridge University Press

Page 31 of 75

European Journal of International Security

31

groups with the umbrella term 'globalists' because they believe in the maintenance of the
postwar international order in contrast to the nationalists.
The typology reaffirms the existence of relatively stable and consistent but also constrained
ideological worldviews of US foreign policy experts.50 While the typology labels used here

iew

ev

rR

ee

rP

Fo
Analysis: Theorizing Qualitative Research (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
2012).
50

Holsti, 'Public Opinion and American Foreign Policy,' p. 127, 192; Wittkopf,' Faces of

Internationalism;' William O. Chittick, Keith R. Billingsley, and Rick Travis, 'A Three
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are nominally similar to previous IR classification schemes,51 the content is different. It

Dimensional Model of American Foreign Policy Beliefs,' International Studies Quarterly,
39 (1995), pp. 313-31; Jon Hurwitz and Mark Peffley, 'How Are Foreign Policy Attitudes

Fo

Structured? A Hierarchical Model,' American Political Science Review, 81 (1987), pp. 10991120; Virginia A. Chanley, 'US Public Views of International Involvement from 1964 to

rP

1993,' Journal of Conflict Resolution, 43 (1999), pp. 23-44; Ulf Bjereld Ann-Marie

ee

Ekengren, 'Foreign Policy Dimensions: A Comparison Between the United States and
Sweden,' International Studies Quarterly, 43:3 (1999), pp. 503–18; and Benjamin I. Page

rR

and Robert Y. Shapiro, The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans' Policy

51

ev

Preferences (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1992).

iew

Large quantitative, survey-based typologies discussed in the US literature typically range

from left liberal internationalists to conservative realists and unilateral nationalist positions,
although the political science literature has never come to a conclusive agreement about how
many and which labels to use for describing the full spectrum of empirical beliefs among
foreign policy actors in the US at a given moment. See Holsti and Rosenau, 'The Structure
of Foreign Policy Attitudes among American Leaders;' Shoon K. Murray, Anchors Against
Change: American Opinion Leaders' Beliefs after the Cold War (Ann Arbor, MI: University
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differs because the typology used here was generated through qualitative reconstruction, not
through quantitative deduction based on standardized survey questions; additionally, the
typology used in this study reflects empirical patterns of beliefs extracted from interviews
in Fall 2017.

Fo

Nevertheless, the typology presented here should not be understood as reified categories,
given the limited sample size and the idiosyncratic and ambiguous nature of individual

rP

actor's assessments of complex foreign policy issues. In other words, the typology presented

ee

here approximates patterns of rules for action that existed among the larger US foreign policy

rR

expert community at the time of the interviews. Table 1 summarizes the five most salient
foreign policy rules for action mentioned by all interviewed experts and these imperatives'

iew

ev

different interpretation by expert type.

of Michigan Press, 1996); Brian C. Rathbun, 'Does One Right Make a Realist?
Conservatism, Neoconservatism, and Isolationism in the Foreign Policy Ideology of
American Elites,' Political Science Quarterly, 123:2 (2008), pp. 271-99; Daniel W. Drezner,
'The Realist Tradition in American Public Opinion,' Perspectives on Politics, 6:1 (2008), pp.
51-70; John T. Rourke and Mark A. Boyer, International Politics on the World Stage, 8th
edition (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2010).
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< INSERT TABLE 1 HERE>

Fo

4.1 Global leadership

rP

As mentioned, rules for action work like frames through which decision-makers, experts,
and other relevant actors reflect their country's global role, its ultimate goals, and values for

ee

which it stands and then use them as guidance to make judgments about present and future

rR

action. In that sense, rules for action become actor imperatives.

ev

The most important rule literally stated by respondents was "US global leadership." It was

iew

usually described in the interviews as maintaining US military and diplomatic presence on
all continents to guarantee a US dominated global order and peace. Many experts mentioned
goals like protection of the US homeland against nuclear war and defense of its borders,
institutions, and citizens against crime, terrorism, cyber-attacks, and illegal immigration.52

52

The prevention of the spread of WMD’s was not mentioned in the interviews as a separate

imperative but subsumed under leadership/primacy/security, a finding that differs from
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However, nationalists, realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals differed in the terminology
used, the priorities, and methods to achieve this rule for action.
While many liberal experts favored using the term "leadership," smaller numbers of
respondents used "liberal hegemony", or the word "primacy," common in the IR literature

of leadership:

rP

Fo

and a favorite among realists in the sample.53 A diplomat provided the following definition

Our US bipartisan fundamental principle has been to create, manage, maintain, protect,

ee

and nurture a global political, economic, and security order in which we as a country

rR

can be secure, thrive, and advance economically and politically. …. Building a global

ev

iew

Porter’s definition of US grand strategy, see Patrick Porter, 'Why America's Grand Strategy
has not Changed,' International Security, 42:4 (2018), p.9.
53

Friedman and Logan claim that 'the vast majority of US foreign policymakers are devotees

of primacy, a grand strategy that sees global US military exertions—alliances, foreign bases,
patrols, military training, regular wars, and continual airstrikes—as the only guarantee of
national security, global stability, and free trade.' See Friedman and Logan, 'Why
Washington Doesn’t Debate Grand Strategy,' p. 14.
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architecture, a political, security and economic architecture, within which we [the
United States] could prosper, maintain our security, and pursue our interests. This is for
me one of the most fundamental US bipartisan principles. … We [the United States] see
ourselves as the architect, manager, and protector of that architecture (Case
28/Liberal).54

Fo

As mentioned, "primacy" covered similar dimensions as "global leadership" but with a focus

rP

on superiority, domination, and reigning-in rising powers or adversaries, a point that is also

ee

recognized in the literature.55 In the interviews, nationalists tended to be "hyperrealists"

rR

considering "primacy" a "natural" byproduct of a nation combining its superpower with its
interests. Realists and many pragmatic liberals argued that the US seeks to promote and

ev

54

iew

In the cited transcripts the symbol "…" denotes that parts of a transcript have been omitted

for the sake of brevity, while […Text…] indicates an addition by the author to make the
citation grammatically correct or its contextual reference better understandable for the
reader.
55

See, for example, Stephen G. Brooks and William C. Wohlforth, 'American Primacy in

Perspective,' Foreign Affairs, 81:4 (2002), pp. 20-33; Thrall and Friedman, US Grand
Strategy in the 21st Century; and Friedman and Sapolsky, 'Unrestrained.'
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protect US military and political interests and assets abroad and to 'maintain the dollar as the
major currency, maintain American global economic dominance, and control of the trade
lines' (Case 19) while carefully avoiding too much and too little foreign intervention to retain
its legitimate global authority.

Fo

A few in the liberal group characterized the United States as a "hegemonic" leader, a term
that was avoided on Capitol Hill and by most think tank respondents because it is seen as

rP

pejorative. But even if this term was not used, the goals of US foreign policy mirror its

ee

dominance in world politics. For example, a respondent pointed out that the United States

rR

follows a geopolitical strategy of forward continental defense with the goal of 'preventing
regional hegemons on either side of the Eurasian landmass emerging. Preventing particularly

ev

Germany and Japan from becoming nuclear powers by providing security for them' (Case

iew

17/Realist). Or in the words of another realist, the United States does not want to 'let major
powers grab and dominate pieces of the planet' (Case 33/Realist).

Interviewees also mentioned the US leadership task 'to maintain or expand American spheres
of influence' by stabilizing or replacing regimes by those more willing to cooperate, and, at
the same time, by containing adversaries. A realist referred in the interview to the IR scholar
John Ikenberry, who supposedly described the
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genius of the American system … that you use your power not to make people want to
do what you do you, but you make it so attractive or so good for them that they want to
do it at their free will (Case 10/Realist).
Members of the liberal group less openly displayed such shrewd foreign policy views and,

Fo

instead, stressed the principle of peacefully engaging adversaries and competitors through
diplomacy and other soft power tools to promote a stable rules-based order. Liberals

rP

criticized a tendency toward militarization among hard power realists to 'take out the

the idea of intervention abroad to

rR

ee

hammer when you reach for the toolbox' (Case 15/Liberal). But liberals were not averse to

ev

'fix' [countries] with [our allies]. It is somewhat naïve but it certainly influences how we
talk about foreign policy [in] any corner of the world. You will find people who are

iew

arguing for US involvement. Whether it is from the development angle, trade, or
military peacekeeping/peacebuilding…. the notion of [US involvement] is still the
normal conversation going on in Congress (Case 12/Liberal).
Among all respondents, a consensus existed about the need for US global
leadership/primacy. However, globalists and nationalists strongly differ on the means
achieving this goal, which supports the blob thesis. For example, globalists criticize the
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nationalists' transactional zero-sum attitude of 'might makes right' which in their eyes rejects
the self-imposed obligations of benign and legitimate US global leadership, which requires
that the US should respect itself the rules of the international order it helped to establish. On
the other hand, ideological and partisan differences also existed between realists, pragmatic
liberals, and liberals about the precise meaning of leadership and how to implement it within

Fo

the framework of the international order. This finding supports the polarization thesis. For

rP

example, while not being opposed to the use of soft power, many realists expressed skeptical

ee

views about its effectiveness. For them the maintenance of military superiority was a
legitimate means to play out US advantages in a rules-based but US dominated order.

rR

Liberals, on the other hand, prioritize soft power and leadership through engagement

ev

strategies, whereas pragmatic liberals typically favored a mix of hard and soft power, like 'a
commitment to peaceful settlement of international disputes backed by the use of force when

4.2 Alliances

iew

necessary' (Case 27/Pragmatic Liberal).

Another rule for action that all respondents shared in the interviews was the imperative to
uphold a system of "alliances" for the good of the United States and for its allies, in particular
containing so-called 'bad guys' and providing order and stability through the use of
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international institutions, laws, and treaties.56 No matter what the actor type, there was a
consensus that the NATO alliance and "fair" burden-sharing are central pillars for historical,
military, political, economic, and cultural reasons:
In the [US] foreign policy elites and the military defense elites, for them NATO is still

Fo

very important, MORE important than sometimes for the Europeans. There was not
much done with regard to NATO in the last 25 years. But for the US elites it is still a

rP

very important institution (Case 19/Pragmatic Liberal).

ee

But sharp disagreements existed among respondents about the meaning and importance of

rR

alliances and multilateralism. Nationalists, while rejecting the label of being isolationists

ev

(Case 35/Nationalist), were most outspoken against giving 'too much legal, cultural, political
power to globalists, the UN' (Case 1/Nationalist), international law, and 'multilateral

iew

agreements' (Case 36/Nationalist), fearing a loss of US national sovereignty to exercise
foreign policy in uni- or bilateral fashion when opportune. Realists, pragmatic liberals, and
liberals, on the other hand, recognized the benefits of international cooperation in enhancing

56

In the literature this instrumental interpretation of alliances and multilateralism is often

associated with liberal institutionalism, see Mearsheimer, 'Bound to Fail,' p. 23.
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US national security and global stability. But realists harbored a more instrumental and
liberals a more cooperative interpretation of collective security and alliances with
democratic capitalist states with similar values.
For realists the US national security and stability of the order had precedence. If necessary,

Fo

they would resort to coalitions of the willing. International institutions (like the UN) and
international law and treaties (like the Paris Climate Accord) were often judged skeptically,

rP

even negatively, either as instruments of weaker powers wanting to constrain the US

ee

freedom of action or as institutions incapable of fulfilling their goals. Even some liberals

rR

agreed that changes were needed, like the following expert:

ev

We do need to develop a strategy of how the United States wants to approach that [goal
of renewing international system]. We need to develop it in consultation with all of our

iew

partners on the [UN] Security Council, even those who are rivals in many instances. We
need to speak more frankly with each other. … All nations need to be consulted in
developing a plan to renew the international system (Case 22/Liberal).
Except for the centrality of NATO as a pillar of US military and political global leadership,
the interpretation of who should be considered an ally, when to go it alone, and what
multilateralism signifies was discussed very differently. Realists, pragmatic liberals, and
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liberals shared a consensus in maintaining a system of alliances because it benefits the US
and rejected the nationalist's adversarial or transactional relationship with traditional US
allies and their emphasis on sovereignty. But the interpretation of how to practice this rule
for action is controversial among realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals. This illustrates
again that both, the blob and polarization theses, capture elements of prevailing beliefs

Fo

among experts, but they lack a comprehensive explanation of the different levels of

rR

ee

4.3 Prosperity

rP

agreement and disagreements surrounding the international order paradigm.

One more rule for action mentioned by all respondents was the "prosperity"57 agenda. It

ev

concerns the promotion of private entrepreneurship, market capitalism, and related
institutions enhancing US prosperity through its global spread. Again, differences appear

iew

when respondents discuss what this means and how this imperative should be implemented.
The nationalists believed that 'free trade is not working for us' (Case 36/Nationalist) and had
a transactional cost-benefit view about how to regain economic primacy and freedom of

57

What I call the prosperity agenda is in the literature often associated with the economic

interdependence theory, Ibid., p.23.
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action through protectionist measures and the abolishment of supranational regulations,
constraining trade agreements, and related institutions (Case 1/Nationalist). In contrast,
realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals all stressed the domestic and international benefits
of an

Fo

open international economic system based on free trade … [since] … there are
multiple national interests, there is not just one. Internationally, we have an interest

rP

in strengthening the rules-based international order, and not seeing a return to spheres

ee

of influence worlds or a world divided into trading blocs again and things like that.

rR

We have an interest in an integrated and open international economic system because
it generates economic growth and employment in the United States …. We have an

ev

interest in bolstering our own domestic economy, which, at the end of the day, is the

iew

engine of our national power. (Case 32/Pragmatic Liberal).

Another pragmatic liberal underscored the objective of strengthening the global position of
the United States as a trading nation interested in free access to markets, an opinion that was
shared by many other realists and pragmatic liberals:
The goals are the maintenance or extension of the market economy, and of the
predominance or considerable share of these markets for the United States, for our banks
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and production companies particularly. More recently, for our electronics and Internet
companies. But obviously the maintenance of a very, very large market share in the
global market is a goal (Case 14/Pragmatic Liberal).
While pragmatic liberals and realists more often focused on the advantages of free trade for

Fo

US business, liberals frequently pointed out the role of free trade in contributing to global
stability, peace, development, pro-Western attitudes, and the spread of individual liberties,

rP

even democratization. This interpretation reflects major tenets of the "Economic or Capitalist

ee

Peace"58 theory. A few liberals also mentioned foreign aid, fair global trade, or the upholding

rR

of standards like the 'right to work, fair labor compensation, and work under conditions that
are humane and safe' (Case 22/Liberal) as aspects of their interpretation of the prosperity

ev

agenda. This is not surprising because liberals are more likely affiliated with the Democratic

iew

Party, which has a strong affiliation with the more regulation-oriented unions.
Overall, there was a consensus among realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals that free trade

58

See Gerald Schneider, 'Capitalist Peace Theory: A Critical Appraisal,' in William R.

Thompson (ed.), The Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017), https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.314.
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and market capitalism a.k.a. globalization is intrinsically good since they have benefited the
United States but also the world economy. These experts also were adamant in their
condemnation of what they saw as the nationalist's anti-globalist rhetoric, anti-free trade
protectionism, transactionalism, and unwillingness to comprehend global prosperity as a
win-win proposal. Thus, the observed views of realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals

Fo

versus the nationalist corroborate the blob thesis. However, the different attitudes between

rP

realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals about the implementation of this rule for action, such

ee

as the degree of regulation, the purposes of trade compacts, and its main beneficiaries, are
in support of the polarization thesis.

ev

rR

4.4 Values

"Values" and what I call in the next section "mission" agenda are ideational imperatives that

iew

help to legitimize the US American foreign policy actions. Here the difference between
nationalists and globalists is the emphasis on how to define, protect, advance, and spread
various aspects of democracy, individual liberties, and the American way of life. While
nationalists do not deny the existence of 'universal' American values, they express a more
laissez faire attitude about the use of values as a tool of foreign policy. A nationalist pointed
out that under Trump
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we are not going to hector them [allies like Egypt and Saudi Arabia] on human rights
issues, … we are turning away from BOTH Bush and Obama (Case 36/Nationalist).
Another nationalist deflected the question about his understanding of values in foreign
policy by stating: We want 'America First', we want to strengthen the United States
[to…] keep things safe, secure, prosperous, and just' for the United States (Case

rP

Fo

1/Nationalist).

Among realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals, on the other hand, a consensus existed that

ee

values are part of the moral compass of US foreign policy, though their meaning and

rR

implementation differed. Equal numbers of experts, among them many liberals and
pragmatic liberals, identified values with a moral commitment to promote human rights,

ev

human dignity, and tolerance, or a responsibility to protect (R2P). Others defined it as the

iew

support for democratic governance, rule of law, or the division of power, including a system
of checks and balances. A third, but smaller group of mostly realists, focused on fostering
the practice of individual rights and civil liberties, the ability to pursue life, liberty,
happiness, and various other freedom rights regarding economic activity, the free exchange
of ideas, innovation, diversity of lifestyles, or making sure that foreign policy is geared
toward protecting humans "from" something, like corruption, totalitarian ideologies, and
autocratic state incursion.
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While not denying that values should be a complement of foreign policy for 'strategic
reasons' (Case 13/Realist) or undergird the US 'security architecture' (Case 16/Realist), many
realists expressed skepticism about the active promotion of values through military or
political intervention, such as the following realist interviewee:

Fo

For instance, in dealing with Russia, we should not be concerned about the way Russia
is ruled. I do not like or admire Vladimir Putin, but I am more interested in making sure

rP

that we do not find ourselves fighting the Russians. When has Russia been democratic?

ee

The same goes… I worry about China as a global superpower, not about how China is

rR

ruled within China. I do not think it should be the role of the United States to intervene
around the world and promote our values (Case 3/Realist).

ev

Typical of pragmatic liberals was the comment of a think tank member (Case 27) who

iew

approvingly observed that the prominent human rights agenda is a normative or aspirational
ideal which 'may slide up and down' in actual policy preference and practice among different
administrations.
In contrast, respondents labeled as liberals and a few pragmatic liberals were more inclined
toward promoting values abroad, arguing, for example, that spreading values like democracy
would help to avoid 'wars, bloodshed, and conflict' because democracies 'do not go to war
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with each other' (Case 18/Pragmatic Liberal), or it would prevent 'bad things from happening
around the world' (Case 25/Liberal). They also pointed out that the United States is not
'imposing our values on the rest of the world' (Case 9/Liberal) but 'speaking for humanity
overall' (Case 6/Liberal). These interpretations align with the Democratic Peace Theory.59

Fo

Several experts commented on the moralistic character of the US values agenda as
'proceeding from a set of almost Protestant puritanical assumptions about the sinfulness of

rP

the world' (Case 16/Realist), or 'making the world in its [the United States] image' (Case

ee

26/Realist), or designed to 'morally inspire' Americans (Case 37/Realist) since referring to

rR

national interest alone would be considered insufficient to motivate the American public to
broadly support US foreign policy. A few interviewees criticized the 'idealism' of the values

ev

agenda (Case 15/Liberal) or pointed out the hypocrisy of selectively promoting democracy

59

iew

and liberal values, as in the case of Europe, where the United States 'rules by rules but in

See Patrick A. Mello, 'Democratic Peace Theory,' in Paul Joseph (ed.), The SAGE

Encyclopedia of War: Social Science Perspectives (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2016), pp. 47276; and Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett 1993, 'Normative and Structural Causes of
Democratic Peace, 1946–1986,' American Political Science Review, 87:3 (1993), pp. 62438.
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Latin America [acts] mostly imperial' (Case 17/Realist).60
Altogether, all experts in this study agreed that values play a role in foreign policy, beyond
that generic agreement, fissures between expert types were again visible. Nationalists had
the most aloof opinion and considered values a feeble moral imperative that did not

Fo

contribute much to US power and interests. Realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals
disagreed with this pessimistic attitude maintaining that values should guide US foreign

rP

policy and, therefore, criticized Trump nationalists for their neglect, if not violation, of

ee

values by dealing with odious regimes and leaders - a finding that supports the blob thesis.

rR

At the same time, globalists differed in their interpretation of the meaning, ranking and
implementation of the values agenda, a result that goes along with the polarization thesis.

iew

ev

4.5 American mission

The multifaceted belief in a US mission was the fifth rule for action shared by all experts.
Both the values and the mission imperatives can be considered morally loaded ideological

60

Seven respondents - representing different globalist expert types - self-critically

remarked that the actual implementation of values in the United States itself was far from
consistent (Cases 10, 14, 18, 26, 28, 33, and 37).
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capstones legitimizing US global leadership, alliances, and prosperity goals. For nationalists,
the mission is a patriotic imperative to restore and maintain the presumed inherent
"greatness" and superiority of the country, a rule for action that is aptly expressed in the
Trump campaign slogan Make America Great Again. This interpretation of the US mission
goes along with an "exemptionalist" America First61 view, according to which the US is not

Fo

bound by rules that apply to other nations.62

rP

While this rhetoric is often derided as parochial swagger at the expense of other nations, the

rR

ee

globalist variant of the mission imperative has an exceptionalist bend.63 It was a nationalist

61 Nicola Nymalm and Johannes Plagemann, 'Comparative Exceptionalism: Universality and

ev

Particularity in Foreign Policy Discourses,' International Studies Review, 21 (2019), p. 22,

62

iew

argue that the America First slogan is an example of Trump's nationalist exemptionalism.
On exemptionalism, see John Gerard Ruggie, 'American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism

and Global Governance,' in Michael Ignatieff (ed.), American Exceptionalism and Human
Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 304-38.
63

American exceptionalism assumes a unique role and character in US history, power

exercise, and identity. The trope of exceptionalism and America’s benevolent mission shines
uncritically through in various descriptions and analyses of US foreign policy strategy and
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respondent (Case 36) who pointed out that
the dominant thinking in the DC policymaking elites … in both parties. … [assumes]
that the United States has a mission … to promote democracy and human rights. And
while there may be a case-by-case selectivity, there is this [notion of a US] global

Fo

mission.

ee

rP

A pragmatic liberal think tank analyst further elaborated on this creed64 according to which

in the public discourse. See, for example, Dick Cheney and Liz Cheney, Exceptional: Why

rR

the World Needs a Powerful America (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015); Hilde Eliassen

ev

Restad, American Exceptionalism: An Idea that Made a Nation and Remade the World

iew

(London: Routledge, 2014); and Hilde Eliassen Restad, 'Are We Coming to the End of
"American Exceptionalism"?' Newsweek, 6 March 2016.
64

Exceptionalist actions and beliefs have been used as cause or effect in describing,

explaining, or legitimizing the particularities of US history, society, foreign policy, and
national identity, see Seymour M. Lipset, American Exceptionalism: A Double-Edged Sword
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1997). The concept is based on assumptions about qualitative
and quantitative differences of the United States as being universal, unique, exempt, or
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the United States has a democracy, stands for goodness, [US values] are not just
American norms but are all universal norms. If you can create a global system wherein
those virtues get expanded and internalized by an ever-larger number of countries
around the world, [the assumption follows that] you will get this more peaceful and
more prosperous world. …That [belief] has been the consensus among the foreign

Fo

policy elite, about how to go about doing that [expansion of the American system] (Case

rP

ee

superior. For a critique, see, for example, Godfrey Hodgson, 'Anti-Americanism and
American Exceptionalism,' Journal of Transatlantic Studies 2 (2004), pp. 27-38.

rR

Exceptionalism often is linked to beliefs about a specific US responsibility, mission, burden,

ev

or model function, referring to specific features of US history, practices, values, institutions,

iew

and conditions, such as geography, resources, power, opportunities, options, and sacrifices.
See, for example, Harold H. Koh, 'America's Jekyll-and Hyde Exceptionalism,' in Michael
Ignatieff (ed.), American Exceptionalism and Human Rights (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 2005), pp. 111-44. Ideological convictions, historical mythologies, cultural
stereotypes, and topoi related to exceptionalism are "manifest destiny," "the Shining City
upon a Hill," "the beacon of the West," "mankind's last best hope," "God's own country,"
"the indispensable nation," "benign leader of the free world," and the like, see Godfrey
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27/Pragmatic Liberal).
In this study, realists (even hard-nosed ones) favored a more "exemplarist" view of the US
mission, namely to teach the rest of the world that following US ideas, principles, policies,
and institutions can lead to national greatness, military power, economic prosperity, and

Fo

individual happiness. In contrast, liberals and some pragmatic liberals typically followed a
"vindicationalist"65 interpretation of mission, meaning that it is a duty and right of the United

rP

States to spread its way of life and its institutions, if necessary by force. This notion is based

ee

Hodgson, The Myth of American Exceptionalism (Yale University, 2009); and Stephen M.

rR

Walt, 'The Myth of American Exceptionalism', Foreign Policy, 189 (2011), pp. 72-5.

ev

Exceptionalism has been used to justify unilateral military intervention as well as principled

iew

multilateralism to encourage altruistic cooperation and peace, see Stewart Patrick,
'Multilateralism and Its Discontents: The Causes and Consequences of US Ambivalence,' in
Stewart Patrick and Shepard Forman (eds), Multilateralism and US Foreign Policy:
Ambivalent Engagement (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2002), pp. 1-46; Paul Pillar, Why
America Misunderstands the World (New York: Columbia Press, 2016); and Sevasti-Eleni
Vezirgianniodu, 'The United States and Rising Powers in a Post-hegemonic Global Order,'
International Affairs, 89:3 (2013), pp. 635-51.
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on a 'fundamental belief in the rightness of American political values and a belief in
democracy and fundamental rights, and a desire …. to promote actively those values
[abroad]' (Case 31/Pragmatic Liberal). As mentioned, this rule for action was often
expressed in moralistic and idealistic language, evidenced by the experts' references to the
benign or otherwise well-intentioned means and purposes of US foreign policy.66

Fo

In the interviews, many realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals confirmed the role that

rP

exceptionalism plays in US foreign policy thinking and recognized its presence in the public

ee

media, in popular culture, among members of Congress, think tank pundits, diplomats, and

65

ev

rR

other experts. Even if perceived as having little impact on actual policy decisions,

iew

Hal W. Brands, What America Owes the World: The Struggle for the Soul of Foreign

Policy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
66

The belief in the US as a benign superpower whose hegemony - unlike that of previous

empires - is resting not only on self-interest and military-economic domination but also on
liberal norms and universal values is confirmed in the literature, see Thomas Diez and Ian
Manners, 'Reflections on Normative Power Europe,' in Felix Berenskoetter and M.J. William
(eds), Power in World Politics (London: Routledge, 2007), pp. 173-88.
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at least it [exceptionalism] is a core belief amongst probably most political leaders and
foreign policy practitioners. You can find some exceptions. Did Nixon and Kissinger
believe in American exceptionalism the way I would define it, no, probably not. Does
Trump? Certainly not! But generally speaking? Yes, I think so (Case 32/Pragmatic
Liberal).

Fo

Only very few interviewees denounced the notion that the US has a mission as merely an

rP

attempt to give the pursuit of national US interests an appearance of benevolence (Case

ee

13/Realist), or as 'hypocrisy' because the country is not 'living up' to its own values (Case

rR

24/Pragmatic Liberal, similarly Case 29/Liberal and Case 33/Realist). Another respondent
criticized the notion that US foreign policy should be guided by a 'special set of rules' as

ev

'exemptionalist' (Case 9/Liberal). A non-US think tank expert complained about the abuse

iew

of exceptionalism. Referencing Walter Russell Mead,67 he commented scornfully that 'it
[America] is … an ideological power that seeks to promote its set of values even at the
expense of completely destabilizing the whole world upside-down' (Case 17/Realist). Such
harsh judgment was very untypical. Instead, even the few (mostly academic) critics of a US

67

Walter Russell Mead, Power, Terror, Peace, and War: America's Grand Strategy in a

World at Risk (New York: Vintage, 2005).
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mission reacted rather defensively to point out that exceptionalist mission thinking was
present in other nations too.
When asked if they believed the American public shared their sense of mission, respondents
agreed that American public opinion was more likely in favor of an exemplarist

Fo

interpretation. 68 An expert commented that the American public - while not adverse to being
told it is exceptional - was inclined to appraise US foreign policy by its perceptible costs and

rP

palpable domestic benefits,69 not with blind trust in the foreign policy community's

ee

benevolent mission to uphold the international order, for which many Americans -

rR

resonating Trump - felt little attachment (Case 37/Realist).

68

iew

ev

Regardless of this known reticence among the US public, the great majority of the globalist

According to PEW polls the US public, in comparison to its elites, shows little appetite

for empire or moral proselytizing abroad, see Andrew Kohut and Bruce Stoker, The Problem
of American Exceptionalism, PEW Research Center, 9 May 2006.
69 For a similar observation about how the public evaluates foreign policy through a domestic

lens, see James Curran, "Americanism, not Globalism": President Trump and the American
Mission (Sidney, Australia: Lowy Institute, July 2018), p. 17.
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experts agreed that the US has a mission and/or responsibility to sustain an international
order of its own creation and for its own survival. This conviction also led realists, pragmatic
liberals, and liberals to criticize the - in their view - exemptionalist inward orientation,
swagger, and jingoism of nationalists. This accord corroborates the blob thesis. However,
the degree of legitimacy of the mission rule for action and the best way to accomplish it

Fo

through vindicationalist or exemplarist action was contested between realists, pragmatic

rP

liberals, and liberals in accordance with the polarization thesis.

rR

ee

5. Main Characteristics of Respondent Types

From observable regularities of the interviewees' positions toward the five rules for action

ev

listed above, the following main characteristics of the four expert types can be established:
In this study, respondents who expressed support or sympathy for an anti-globalist,

iew

protectionist, values-indifferent agenda of US power and patriotic fervor were labelled
"nationalist." They pessimistically worried about the bad intentions of other nations and
leaders but optimistically claimed that a more aggressive and frequently unilateral approach
in foreign policy would safeguard US interests better and help the US to prevail in a fiercely
competitive global environment. They defended major elements of Donald Trump's agenda,
such as his veneration of national sovereignty, his complaint about lament of ungrateful
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NATO allies taking advantage of the US, the supposedly unfair trade practices of
competitors, and the nation-building policy mistakes of his presidential predecessors. At the
same time, three of the four nationalist respondents disapproved of Trump's blunt attentiongetting communication style, bombastic rhetoric, and his often unpredictable, jumbled, and
mercurial character and decision making.70

Fo

In general, experts who were in favor of securing US primacy through a policy of strength

rP

with a focus on maintaining security alliances but skeptical of multilateral commitments,

ee

favoring prosperity through free trade, supporting an exemplarist mission while rejecting an

rR

active promotion of values through intervention were identified as "realist." For them the
US responsibility is to promote its short and long-term interests against competitors and foes

ev

alike in a world ruled by the objective laws of brittle human nature. In general, realists (and

iew

70

In the sample, only two respondents suppressed any open criticism of Trump although

they were in favor of upholding the rules-based international order (Case 30/Realist, Case
31/Pragmatic Liberal). They possibly silenced their criticism because of an expectation of
being hired by the Trump Administration and, therefore, not wanting to expose themselves
or leave traces of disloyalty in the interviews. Other contacted Trump supporters
unfortunately did not respond or participate in the study.
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nationalists) had a more pessimistic Hobbesian world view according to which historical
success and the security of a society is ultimately determined by national interest and military
power - though not only and not always.71
Respondents in support of both a mix of realist and liberal imperatives were labelled as

Fo

"pragmatic liberals."72 Their opinions often came with a ring of opportunism, aloofness, and
skepticism. Many appeared to be cautious and seemed to not want to take an ideological

rP

stand on issues. Compared to realists and liberals, pragmatic liberals appeared to be more

ee

willing to change their positions depending on a specific purpose, situation, or circumstance.

rR

Often pragmatic liberals combined pragmatic no-nonsense, even hardnosed realist attitudes
with views borrowed from the internationalist perspective of liberals. For example,

ev

71

iew

See also Felix Berenskoetter, 'Mapping the Mind Gap: A Comparison of US and European

Security Strategies,' Security Dialogue, 36 (2005), p. 75.
72

The small size of the sample did not allow to distinguish further nuanced patterns within

this group but it appeared that they represented positions across non-party and party lines
including, for example centrist Democrats and moderate Republicans willing to reach across
the aisle in favor of situational pragmatic bipartisan rather than ideological and value-driven
solutions, or power-maximization.
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pragmatic liberals would situationally be in favor of either soft or hard power tools, pursue
unilateralism or multilateralism, or strike a win-win balance between advancing US national
interests and human rights values at the same time. In some cases, this attitude may also be
an indication of non-commitment, that is upholding norms only rhetorically as an ideal or
simply claiming well-meant intentions.

Fo

Experts categorized as "liberal" stressed the supposedly "noble" or "benign" intentions and

rP

exceptional goodwill of the United States to champion progressive Wilsonian or Kantian

ee

ideals of international leadership through engagement, cooperative multilateralism,

rR

prosperity through regulated free trade, and the promotion of democracy, and universal
values like human rights. They considered US institutions and values as unique and

ev

exceptional in certain aspects. As the most powerful player in the international system they

iew

also believed the United States has a global responsibility, if not a vindicationalist mission,
to uphold the international order and protect the global commons against global threats like
climate change, poverty, terrorism and the like as well as against immoral and unjust
adversaries who oppose American "universal" goals and values.
As explained in the previous sections, realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals, including
members of the Republican and Democratic Party, put a clear distance between their own
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understanding and support of the post-WWII international order and what they saw as
unworkable and antagonizing nationalist policy agenda and slogans like "America First."
Several respondents pointed out that other members of the foreign policy community,
including those in the Trump administration, shared their critical views.73 In other words,
regardless of party membership or ideological inclination a gulf separated these "globalists"

Fo

from Donald Trump and his nationalist followers' agenda of a zero-sum competitive struggle

iew

ev

rR

ee

rP
73

A pragmatic liberal (Case 7, Think tank) intimated that even Republicans 'holdovers' from

the Reagan and GW Bush Administration among President Trump's inner circle felt
alienated. Another think tank member pointed out, that many senior level administrators in
the DOD and the State Department continue to believe in the liberal international order (Case
32/Pragmatic Liberal). In fact, ten experts said that several of Trump's (at the time mostly
military) advisors tried to curb the worst instincts of the President. Among them, a nationalist
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of nations, enterprises, and leaders.74 As we have seen, interpretation differences about

commented on the irony that traditional mainstream and liberal Conservatives - only a little
more hawkish than Obama - who 'would never have dreamed of supporting Trump in the

Fo

[Republican] Primary' elections (Case 36/Nationalist), now work in the Trump
Administration to restrain the President. Similar observations are reported by Bob

rP

Woodward, Fear: Trump in the White House (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2018).
The distance between the US foreign policy elite and Donald Trump and his supporters

ee

74

also has been observed in the literature, see Daniel S. Hamilton and Teija Tiilikainen,

rR

Domestic Determinants of Foreign Policy in the European Union and the United States

ev

(Washington, DC: Center for Transatlantic Relations and Finnish Institute of International

iew

Affairs, 2018), pp. 7-8, 76, 103; A. Trevor Thrall, 'Beyond Hawks and Doves: Identifying
the Restraint Constituency,' in A. Trevor Thrall and Benjamin H. Friedman (eds), The Case
for Restraint: US Grand Strategy for the 21st Century (New York: Routledge, 2017); Dina
Smeltz, Ivo Daalder, Karl Friedhoff, and Craig Kafura, What Americans Think about
America First, Results of the 2017 Chicago Council Survey of American Public Opinion and
US Foreign Policy, Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2017, pp. 13-4; Schultz, 'Perils of
Polarization for US Foreign Policy;' Busby and Monten, 'Has Liberal Internationalism been
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nominal identical rules for action also existed between realists, pragmatic liberals, and
liberals supporting the notion of the existence of a partisan and ideological polarization. At
the same time their unmitigated opposition against nationalist positions justified their
categorization as the blob.

Fo

6. Summary and Outlook

rP

The purpose of this article was to present the findings from 37 qualitative interviews in Fall

ee

2017 that help us to better understand the dimensions that characterize US grand strategy

rR

imperatives a.k.a. rules for action during a time of enormous shifts in domestic and

ev

international relations after Donald Trump became president. Two seemingly contradictory
explanations, the blob and the polarization theses have attempted to explain foreign policy

iew

elite perceptions. The reconstructivist methodology used to analyze the interviews revealed

Trumped?'; and John Halpin et al., America Adrift (Washington, DC: Center for American
Progress, 2019); Joshua D. Kertzer et. al., 'Elite Misperceptions and the Domestic Politics
of Conflict,' 8 January 2020, http://people.fas.harvard.edu/~jkertzer/, accessed 9 March
2020.
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both strengths and weaknesses in these explanations. While each thesis captures elements of
prevailing grand strategy rules for action among experts, each lacks a comprehensive
explanation of the commonalities and differences as well as shortcomings and conflicts
inherent to these imperatives.

Fo

The polarization thesis ignores that realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals, i.e., the
globalists, all agree with the postwar international order's five rules for action, defending

rP

them against Trump's nationalist challenge. The blob thesis, on the other hand, ignores the

ee

existence of continuous ideological and partisan cleavages that divide the globalists among

rR

themselves in their interpretation of the order's imperatives.

ev

Because the definition, meaning, and implementation of the five salient rules for action
among the expert interviewees were so broad, they allowed for a variety of respondent

iew

interpretations, even contradictory ones; for example, the how, where, when, and why of soft
and hard power use while exercising global leadership/primacy. Similarly, different
understandings existed among the four expert types of who should be considered an ally, the
degree of uni- or multilateralist policies, and the engagement with allies and foes alike.
Regarding the prosperity rule, the balancing of domestic with foreign policy needs, the
degrees of regulation, the purposes of trade compacts, and its main beneficiaries were
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contested. Different interpretations also applied to the two ideational values and mission
rules for action. The meaning, importance, legitimacy, and implementation of "universal"
values versus national interests, and how the US foreign policy mission is defined,
legitimated and should be practiced was in dispute. These disagreements reflect inherent
conflicts between the five rules for action, such as pursuing power politics to implement

Fo

national interests and, at the same time, upholding values like democracy, justice, and human

rP

rights.75

ee

Nationalists stood out because they opposed the globalist notion of multilateral and

rR

cooperative arrangements of sharing power and prosperity as being naïve and detrimental to
US interests and dominance. The hard-nosed Machiavellian position about zero-sum

ev

transactional relationships with their followers and foes alike, leads nationalists also to

iew

discount the usefulness of values in setting the US foreign policy grand strategy as limiting
the exercise of its superpower and sovereignty. Similarly, nationalists unabashedly
advocated for the exemptional greatness of the United States over the globalists

75

A realist expert also makes this point, arguing that 'there has been always a struggle

between those different priorities in each administration […] the balance of hard power with
human rights concerns, the nature of the regimes we are dealing with …' (Case 37/Realist).
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vindicationalist or exemplarist mission imperatives.
How can we explain the findings that realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals differ in their
interpretation of the liberal order grand strategy but at the same time are expressing a
consensus in support of this order against the nationalist insurgency? According to Dye and

Fo

Zeigler's elite theory, the maintenance of political, social, and ideological power is an elite's
priority. Because Trump is questioning the imperatives of the postwar world, the order's

rP

supporters see this as an existential threat to their fundamental creed and existence,

ee

regardless of their own partisan and ideological disagreements which 'are largely limited to

rR

means of achieving common [globalist] goals.'76 In addition, since Trump won his office as
an anti-elitist outsider attacking the professional foreign policy class in DC, he created a

ev

"rally around the flag" effect, alienating experts of all convictions and - ironically - also

76

iew

made it difficult to staff his administration with loyal supporters.

See Dye and Zeigler, 'The Irony of Democracy,' p. 12. However, Gries disagrees and

argues that so-called liberal idealists and realists can be distinguished by how they treat
policy ends and means. The former focus on the ends whereas the latter on the means, see
Peter H. Gries, The Politics of American Foreign Policy: How Ideology divides Liberals and
Conservatives over Foreign Affairs (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), p. 109.
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What explains the reticence of the interviewed realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberal experts
in developing an alternative narrative beyond the postwar US-centric international order as
response to the nationalist challenge? From the interviews it became clear that most
respondents believed the postwar order had successfully served US interests and values and it would continue to do so.77 While embracing the benefits of the international order,

Fo

realists, pragmatic liberals, and liberals were at the time of the interviews in Fall 2017, still

rP

unprepared to respond to Donald Trump's nationalist agenda with a new strategic narrative.

ee

One of the reasons for their defensive attitude was the shock of Trump's election. Many
interviewees stated that before his election they had not realized the danger posed by

rR

nationalism, nor had they thought about the origins and causes of Trump's success or

ev

contemplated how to respond to his insurgency.

iew

Instead, the comments of some interviewees displayed vague hopes that the damages of the
Trump administration's foreign policy could be somehow mitigated by the moderating
influence of the so-called "adults" in the White House, reasonable voices in Congress, or the

77

Similar Jack Thompson, 'Understanding Trumpism: The New President's Foreign Policy,'

Sirius, 1:2 (2017), pp. 1-6.
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Mueller investigation that had started in May 2017.78 These wishes were at the same time
often mixed with palpable pessimism about the irreparable effects of Trump's policies
combined with a gloomy "present at the destruction" posture about the vanishing fortunes of
the globalist international order.

Fo

Other respondents expressed the hope that after Trump, the postwar, US-centric world order
somehow could be revived to its previous glory through some miraculous "snap back" to the

rP

status-quo ante where supposedly US benevolence and good intentions ruled.79 Altogether,

ee

globalists, like those sampled in this study in Fall 2017, did not critically reflect on their

According to Porter these hopes among the foreign policy elite faded quickly because

ev

78

rR

rules for action nor were they ready to formulate foreign policy alternatives.

iew

Trump undauntedly enacted his campaign promises against the elite's opposition and advice,
see Porter, 'Why US Grand Strategy has not Changed,' pp. 38-45.

79 See Doug Stokes, 'Trump, American Hegemony and the Future of the Liberal International

Order,' International Affairs, 94:1 (2018), p. 134. However, shortly after Trump's term
started, already some conservative Democrats hinted that a "snap back" option is unlikely,
see Madeleine Albright and Stephen Hadley, Submitted Statement, Committee on Armed
Services, United States House of Representatives (21 March 2017).
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Because international relations are rapidly changing, partially as a consequence of Trump's
foreign policy, it is unlikely that US foreign policy can or will simply turn back the clock to
a "business as usual" after Trump is out of office in 2020 or 2024.80 Cosmetic changes to the
postwar grand strategy, like a reconstitution of the old consensus via re-emphasizing of soft
power values or more restraint, may not suffice either. Therefore, the criticism of Walt,

Fo

Mearsheimer, Carpenter and other senior academic commentators and analysts remains

rP

valid.81

ee

In fact, together with the ceaseless dismantling of the rules-based order by Trump since

rR

taking office in January 2017, it appears the Beltway's consensus on reviving the postwar
order in its pre-Trump form shows signs of dissolution. For example, a discussion has started

ev

among ideological and partisan groups from left to right about how to deal with the

See Ian O. Lesser, 'What to Expect from the United States: A Look Ahead at US Foreign

Policy,' IAI Papers, 2 (2020), pp. 1-10.
81

iew

80

See footnote 3. A RAND study also has laid out some options for a post-liberal new world

order 2.0., see Michael J. Mazarr, Miranda Priebe, Andrew Radin, and Astrid Stuth Cevallos,
Alternative Options for US Policy toward the International Order (Santa Monica, CA:
RAND Corp, 2017).
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shortcomings of the international order grand strategy and what to put in its place after
Trump.82 These voices recognize that whether caused by outside forces not controlled by the
US, by inability, incompetence, or domestic deliberate action, a collapse of central pillars of
a fragmenting international order could lead to a new world order that is based on rules for

iew

ev

rR

ee

rP

Fo
82

Progressive voices are Jentleson, Kizer, vandenHeuvel, Sachs, Sanders, and Warren.

Libertarians are represented mostly by the Cato Institute, such as Ashford, Carpenter, Glaser,
and Preble. Supporters of (neo)realist conservative policies of restraint, retrenchment, and
offshore balancing are Bacevich, Handle, Layne, Mearsheimer, Posen, Ruger, and Walt.
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action that are less favorable to US interests.83
From the perspective of elite theory, however, a certain scepticism is advisable. How
realistic is the expectation that the prevailing inertia and group think mentality among the
foreign policy expert class in DC eventually will give way to a burgeoning pluralist grand

Fo

strategy debate? It is not yet clear if the "mainstream" foreign policy community is
recognizing past errors and is ready to make fundamental adjustments to US foreign policy

rP

toward a peaceful, sustainable, and stable new international order where the pursuit of

ee

Many moderate Democrats in favor of competitive geopolitics like Rapp-Hooper, Rhodes,

rR

Sullivans have gathered in the so-called National Security Action. Conservative defenders

ev

of the status quo ante can be found among American Affairs and some of its defenders are

iew

Brands, Brooks, Haass, Ikenberry, Lind, Stokes, Wohlforth. Conservative nationalists can
be found in the Heritage Foundation, American Enterprise Institute, Breitbart and are
represented by academics like Dueck and Schweller. For a review of the debates and
positions, see, for example, Emma Ashford and A. Trevor Thrall, 'The Battle Inside the
Political Parties for the Future of US Foreign Policy,' (Washington, DC: CATO Institute,
2018); A. Trevor Thrall and Jordan Cohen, 'The Democrats' Search for a New Foreign
Policy' (Cato at Liberty Blog, January 16, 2020), https://www.cato.org/blog/democrats-
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national interests aligns with multilateralism, international law, and values, like human
rights. A reform of the traditional grand strategy consensus is influenced by many
imponderables, not least the continuing belief in America's exceptionalist mission and
primacy as well as the seductive allure of nationalism à la Trump.84
As, with any scientific approach, the findings presented in this study are incomplete and

Fo

limited in their scope.85 However, they do demonstrate the value of qualitative studies and

iew

ev

rR

ee

rP
search-new-foreign-policy, accessed 9 March 2020; and Colin Dueck et.al., 'Policy
Roundtable: The Future of Conservative Foreign Pol/icy,' Texas National Security Review
(2018),

https://tnsr.org/roundtable/policy-roundtable-the-future-of-conservative-foreign-

policy/, accessed 9 March 2020.
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the utility of the reconstructivist method in developing an empirically grounded typology
to describe the dimensions that characterize US grand strategy imperatives during a time of
enormous shifts in domestic and international relations. Complementing earlier leadership
studies and contemporary large quantitative surveys, these in-depth interviews provide
additional rich insights for policy analysis about the complex reasonings of elites. Such

Fo

studies deserve consideration in future empirical investigations that will hopefully test and

rP

refine the outcomes presented here since a more detailed knowledge of elite beliefs will

83

ev

rR

ee

allow to deeper comprehend the direction US foreign policy may take in the future.86

iew

For example, R. David Harden, 'America Adrift: Trump has Ended the 'Post-World War

II Era',' The Hill (October 16, 2019); Hilde Eliassen Restad, ' Whither the “City Upon a
Hill”? Donald Trump, America First, and American Exceptionalism', Texas National
Security Review, 3(1) (2019), https://tnsr.org/2019/12/whither-the-city-upon-a-hill-donaldtrump-america-first-and-american-exceptionalism.
84

Some critics of US foreign policy are pessimistic about a fundamental reform of US grand

strategy and the willingness of the US American public and elite to accept that a multi-
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centric world of equals is incompatible with the belief that being number one is the only
option. For example, the Australian James Curran claims that 'America will not become a
"normal nation". It will not lose entirely that sense of special mission, simply because that

Fo

part of its national creed runs so deep and because those in the foreign policy elite are
creatures of their culture: the America in which they came to maturity and in which their

rP

world view was formed was the America of Kennedy, Johnson, Reagan, and Clinton. The

ee

Washington elite will not easily lose their taste for being a superpower. They will cling
tightly to the vision and vigor inherent in the description of the United States as the

rR

"indispensable nation",' see James Curran, 'Americanism, not Globalism,' p. 16. A promoter

ev

of American exceptionalism 3.0 is Charles A. Kupchan, 'The Clash of Exceptionalisms. A

85

iew

New Fight over an Old Idea,' Foreign Affairs, March/April (2018), pp. 139-148.
As mentioned, the placement of individual expert's beliefs by type and rule for action is

approximate. Also, the investigator would have preferred more nationalists represented in
this study.
86

The case for a better integration of humanities, social sciences, and mixed methods in

policy analysis is eloquently made by Michael Desch, Cult of the Irrelevant: The Waning
Influence of Social Science on National Security (Princeton, Princeton UP, 2019).
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Table 1: US Grand Strategy Rules for Action by Expert Type
GRAND
STRATEGY
RULES FOR
ACTION

EXPERT TYPE

Nationalists (N=4)
Realists (N=10)
 Rejecting global order
leadership obligation
 Seeking US
supremacy through
zero-sum power
politics against foes &
competitors alike
 Priority of economic
and military tools

Interpretations
of the Alliance
Imperative

 Uni- or bilateral action
preferred & avoidance
of multilateral treaty
obligations
 Priority of national
sovereignty. Prefers
opportunistic alliances
 Skeptical about free
trade & globalization
 In favor of
transactional deals
 Protectionist agenda
using tariffs, trade
restrictions, sanctions

 Primacy through
offshore balancing &
military deterrence
 Promotion of a
secure rules-based
order
 Priority of hard
power tools. Soft
power use if
opportune
 Instrumental
multilateralism
 Priority of US
national security &
collective stability
through flexible
coalitions
 Free global trade and
markets and trade
compacts without
regulations
 Increase US market
share & businessfriendly
environments
 Utilitarian support
for individual &
freedom rights
 Skeptical about
active intervention
for values
 Exemplarist - US is
a leading force &
model
 US has a special &
unique character, its
power, interests,
principles,
institutions,
experiences, and
achievements are
historically singular
 Slogans: Shining
City upon a Hill,
Beacon of the West

Interpretations
of the Mission
Imperative

 Exemptionalist,
inward oriented
patriotism
 US has no mission or
responsibility for other
nations or intl. order
 US is superior, the
best, bravest, greatest
nation, if it follows
only its interests
 Slogans: America
First, Make America
Great Again

 Leadership through
engagement
 Promotion of a stable rulesbased order
 Priority of soft power tools
but hard power also used to
maintain order & promote
human rights
 Cooperative multilateralism
 Priority of collective
security & integration
through a coalition with
liberal democratic states
(Democratic Peace Theory)

Mix of
Realist and
Liberal
positions

 Free global trade and
markets with regulations to
enhance non-economic
goals (Economic Peace
Theory)
 Uphold standards, like
transparency, labor laws,
environment etc.
 Universalist promotion of
human rights, democracy &
humanitarian
intervention/R2P

Mix of
Realist and
Liberal
positions

iew

 Passive "laissez faire"
attitude about values
agenda as political
tool

Liberals (N=9)

Mix of
Realist and
Liberal
positions

ev

Interpretations
of the Values
Imperative

rR

Interpretations
of the
Prosperity
Imperative

ee

rP

Fo

Interpretations
of the
Leadership
Imperative

Globalists
Pragmatic
Liberals
(N=14)
Mix of
Realist and
Liberal
positions

Mix of
Realist and
Liberal
positions

 Vindicationalist - outward
oriented, expand the rulesbased international order
 US values, ideals, beliefs,
intentions, goodwill are
unique, universal, and
inherently noble and
benevolent
 Slogans: Indispensable
nation, Protector of the
Weak, Global Superman

Note: Placement of individual expert's beliefs by type and rule for action is approximate
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